The Great War, Sir Mike, and Me

The Great War, Sir Mike, and Me

Written by Michael

Topics: Uncategorized

Several Yale students enjoying lunch, and the fact that they are not dead.

In the fall of 1990, I had no interest in World War I; then as now, I studied history for the story of it, and there didn’t seem to be any narrative in that conflict. No personalities, no resolution, just four years of static, blood-drenched dress rehearsal for the much more satisfying sequel played out from 1939 to ‘45. But I had requirements for my major, a hole in my schedule, and a humor magazine to run. “History 417a: The First World War” was the only thing that could possibly fit. So I enrolled, without enthusiasm, resolving to sit in the back. Maybe I could prop a book up on its end and catch a few winks; The Record regularly kept me up until four am or later (other things did too).

Here I began to get lucky. First, Yale—or really any college—is the perfect place to study history. The setting and structure emphasizes continuity; on a college campus one can finally grasp what a self-flattering lie it is to think that there is anything new under the sun. Walking around Yale, it’s obvious that the glory of humanity (if indeed we have any) is in the slow and steady accrual of mundane virtues: less hunger, more knowledge, less disease, more compassion. Year on year, person by person this is accomplished, or it isn’t, and when you are in a place with lists of war dead carved into the walls—and bright, beautiful alive people eating lunch around you—which is the right path and which the wrong is obvious if you’re paying any attention.

"In England, we have a word for you guys, and that word is 'dicks.'"

History 417a was being taught by a slightly unusual instructor; that was my second stroke of luck. Sir Michael Howard was, at age 68, too old to teach at Sandhurst, Britain’s equivalent to West Point; and had consequently loaned himself out to us Americans. I am sure there were other professors cruising tweedily about New Haven who could have taught the subject as well as Professor Howard; but it wouldn’t have been the same. The First World War was primarily a European endeavor, and Europeans have a relationship to it that other countries do not. “The First World War” is, for example, a name that reflects the primacy of America; while Europeans had been marching and dying en masse for millennia, it was our first world war, and this perspective helped set the nomenclature. For Europeans, of course, it was the “Great War,” and the still greater war that followed simply a continuation. To be taught this period by a man who grew up in its shadow—who could not help but feel the trauma it had inflicted on literally everyone in his life—was a unique opportunity.

My third piece of good fortune was that I was in the middle of my first adult love affair. Until you are in love, you remain quite ignorant of life’s true scale, and the desire for that grandness is something we all feel, in our bones and other places. This sense of something unseen but terribly important, and a desire to participate in it, is why wars run on teenagers; it is also the tragedy of war, how it takes something positive and uses it for destructive ends. The romance of war only stands in for the real thing; love of country only satisfies until a person is in one’s arms. The moment one truly falls in love, war becomes what it is: a threat and a madness.

The scene of "History 417a: The First World War."

So for three months, Sir Michael Howard shepherded a hundred or so of us future leaders of the world (you’re welcome) through the sorry events of 1914 to 1918. As my friend Rob and I traded jokes in the shadows—he was a fellow Record E-Boarder, and just as punch-drunk as I—the facts and conclusions flew like shrapnel. What an unholy mess it had been, starting as a comic opera (if the Archduke’s driver hadn’t taken a wrong turn, and Princip hadn’t stopped for a sandwich, the assassination would’ve never happened), and ending like a Wagnerian tragedy. Then as now, it’s difficult to keep the facts in order. Ypres, Mons, Verdun, Chateaubriand—is that one, I forget? The battles are almost impossible to keep straight because they are all the same: stupid plans carried out with incredible bravery, unimaginable slaughter ending in utter stalemate.

“By the end of 1915, the French had lost 995,000 men.” That fact alone is enough to paralyze the imagination, or should be. A million men from one country? In three months? And they were just getting started. How many Einsteins, and Picassos bled their lives away into the dirt of Flanders? How many Alexander Flemings or Louis Armstrongs suffocated in a collapsed dugout, or froze to death on the Eastern Front? How many—and now I am speaking as my 21-year-old self—Thurbers or Benchleys or Groucho Marxes perished? What wars really destroy is potential, the future, and that is something simply too big to mourn. And so Rob and I kept joking, even going so far to pop “Sir Mike” into the magazine for an issue or two. He took it all in very good humor; somewhere I have a letter from him mock-failing us both.

There is no story in World War I, only suffering. There are no great heroes who triumph, nor villains who are vanquished; there is no cause thrumming underneath worth all the sacrifice, nor any final victory redeeming it all. It is, to be blunt, some of the most depressing, unsatisfying history one can study. That is its gift to us, and why everyone should have a passing familiarity with it. Especially citizens of countries who emerged from it relatively whole, and have a tendency to forget what they do not wish to remember—yes, I’m talking to you, United States.

"Well, chaps, at least this is the war to end all wars."

Though it could be seen in the American Civil War, it was the conflict of 1914-18 that demonstrated beyond any doubt that industrialization had rendered war obsolete. Not obsolete in an emotional sense—the human animal will always be aggressive—but obsolete in that it no longer served its stated purpose. To put it in modern terms, war is a faulty product. We are sold it is a means of resolving conflict; industrialized war does not do this.

I’d argue that it cannot. Industrialized war inflicts too much trauma on too many people, so that it changes from a set of events bounded by time, into a psychological disorder. Each conflict carries the emotional seeds of the next which, being fought by even more powerful technology, inflicts even more trauma on that generation. And so World War I led to World War II, as surely as a bruise follows a blow. And after that the so-called “Cold War,” which did not seem very cold to the Chinese dying in the 1940s, or in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, the Balkans…

Think about that. Seventy years and hundreds of millions of deaths later, we were back in the BALKANS. Could there be any stronger proof that this behavior does not work? Industrialized war serves no one but itself. On my gloomier days I feel certain that our current “War on Terror” is only something to distract us while they get the stage ready for the next big show.

It is said that the next war will be the last one, “The War to End All Wars,” but they’ve been saying that since 1918, so I suspect that is not the case. The next war will inflict incredible suffering upon humanity and the Earth, as far beyond our experience as the Great War would’ve been to someone raised in the time of Napoleon. Most appeals for peace invoke this nebulous future horror; and this is why the idea of peace exerts such a weak pull on our affairs. There is too much imagination required. Future suffering is abstract, while immediate maneuvers are fatally tangible. So the planners plan anew. “Will it really be so bad?” they whisper among themselves, and distribute their latest secret schemes for living in holes, or under the sea, or whatever other Hell they’re considering.

Gen. Curtis LeMay, lunatic

If our modern madness has a name, this is it. The only reason some members of the US military advocated a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union was, obviously, they felt that they and theirs would come out all right. One always believes that one will survive, this is how human beings are constructed. In people like Curtis LeMay, that instinct was infinitely more powerful than their imagination; that’s the difference between him and say, Jackson Browne. I’d argue one cannot be Curtis LeMay—or indeed any part of the modern military—without killing that precise area of one’s imagination. If a neurotic sees death and decay everywhere, the modern military mind sees everything but death and decay, and must, or be unable to function.

This mental illness is transferred to the public at large via green-tinted film of “stealth bombers” delivering “smart bombs.” There is nothing stealthy about modern warfare and nothing smart about munitions, and only someone who considers warfare theoretical, or as a form of career advancement, could come up with such terms. There is no such thing as collateral damage; there is only damage. Beginning with World War I, conflicts between governments became wars against peoples, with the civilians coming in for more and more punishment. This trend has only increased. Yet we still perceive war as if it happens to other people—to the soldier, say, or the leader. When this was true—before 1914—most wars lasted weeks, and had casualties in the thousands. The leaders and generals grew tired of it quickly, and being the ones who could stop it, did so.

Beginning with World War I, human beings began conducting mechanized genocide, and calling it an affair of state. This, and not faulty morality on the part of a few bad apples, is what makes modern warfare slur so easily into genocide. Modern war is genocidal; there are no noncombatants. A Irishman on the Lusitania who drowns, a German baby who dies from lack of food, a Londoner who is killed by a bomb, a soldier who dies from gas—to cling to some sense of difference between any of these is to fatally injure one’s humanity, to adopt convenience and call it morality.

The scale of violence built in to industrialized warfare means that it cannot resolve conflict. This is what I learned in that dingy room smelling of chalk and floor polish almost twenty years ago. Modern war simply does not perform as advertised. It cannot do so—which means that its only possible reason for continuance is an emotional one. War persists due to the satisfaction of urges deep within the human psyche, urges which, if anything can be called this, are the darkest evil.

"We're fighting where? AGAIN?"

I am not a pacifist, nor do I hold out any great hope for the fundamental change of psychology that is necessary to consign modern war to what Sir Michael Howard probably called “the dustbin of History.” But I do believe that human beings will, if given the facts, move towards their own happiness and away from misery. And so if we can learn that modern war is a great evil that does not work, perhaps we can begin to move to other, less destructive methods of resolving conflict. We have a right to act as we wish, but we do not have a right to prevent others from living, either by poisoning the earth, or so poisoning our souls that they perpetuate our cycle of bitterness and revenge. Technology has taken the option of war away from us; and as the temptation towards war exists in our psychology, only 30,000 years removed from the trees, so too the solution must arise from inside each of us. We must feel that war is obsolete, and recognize the slick salesman’s pitch for what it is: a substitute for real romance, a life really worth living. A substitute that brings nothing but sorrow.

• • •

Some kind soul has uploaded most of the BBC’s wonderful documentary on World War I, “The Great War,” and I spent most of this last weekend digging through it. First broadcast in 1964, it is exhaustive, and somewhat exhausting, but well worth watching. Sixty-four, eh? As I watched, I couldn’t help but imagine the grim visuals being enlivened by muffled Beatles songs coming from the kid’s room upstairs. Beatlemania was a life-affirming reaction to the great European death-wish of the first half of the twentieth century, But that is a topic for another post. I’ve embedded the first installment of the first program, “On the Idle Hill of Summer.”

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8 Comments Comments For This Post I'd Love to Hear Yours!

  1. dirk voetberg says:

    Jesus H. Great post. Ugh. One of the biggest things that's occurred to me is that, yes, war is absolutely out-date, obsolete. We're constantly trying to figure out how to deter and protect by attacking or walling off, attacking and walling off, and on and on. The Bush Administration and, still, Cheney seem to think it's naive to crack that pattern. But, really, that continued habit of attacking and walling off is what's naive. You can't just keep doing that and expecting that, magically, one day, despite all that, the world becomes safe and clear of conflict or, even weirder, that you can just keep attacking more and more and building higher and thicker walls, for absolutely ever.

    Now, Obama is adding troops to Afghanistan. That seems maybe continuing down the same path. But, maybe(?) with this new twist of immediately bringing in administrative/governmental infrastructure once a town's "liberated" will be a step in the right direction? I don't know.

    But you're absolutely right. All those lives lost. And it doesn't work.

  2. jerry nk says:

    thanks, michael. nice thoughts about the bleakness of the great war. it's only through teaching about it that i've come to see it as meaningful — for me it'd always been persona-less and inaccessible just as you describe.

    and then of course the unspeakable irony is that less than 20 years later they were at it again. italy in ethiopia was the same damn thing that got them all into it the first time.

    and because my history classes have just been enjoying the surprisingly vivid poems that came out of the war, here's the end of eric bogle's song about the war, written well after but spot on for the sentiment. the last lines are too horrible for me to make it through.

    Did you really believe them when they told you the cause?
    You really believed that this war would end war?
    But the suffering, the sorrow, the glory, the shame –
    The killing and dying – it was all done in vain.
    For Willie McBride, it's all happened again
    And again, and again, and again, and again.

  3. jacDesVert says:

    Simple questions:
    How do you deal with aggressor states who see war as the mechanism for furthering their religious, financial or domestic policies?

    Do you have any actual understanding of fourth generation warfare? (You know, how we presently are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.) This diatribe appears to consider all was as being WW1 and never consider that the methods of war have changed on all sides.

    You state that war persists due to the darkest evils in men's psyche, but that ignores that one side is defending itself and protecting its people and homes. Is this then an evil? I suppose the attacked could capitulate and become slaves, but would that be the romantic "let's all just get along" that you preach? I doubt you'd feel the same if it was you and yours that were being enslaved.

    Nice vision, but a complete detachment with reality.

    • mgerber937 says:

      Thanks for reading, Jac! Here are a few simple answers, though I doubt you will agree with them.

      You deal with aggressor states by not creating them in the first place. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, the prototypical modern aggressor states, were both directly created by the traumas felt by the German and Russian civilian populations in the First World War. Aggressor states are deviations from the norm, mutations made infinitely more likely by wide-scale suffering, want, and feelings of powerlessness. You can also prove the case from the other direction: In 1945, we acted differently towards the defeated nations–rebuilding their societies into stable, prosperous systems–and got the opposite result. This is not romanticism, but intense practicality.

      Our actions in Iraq and Afghanistan are excellent examples of how modern technology has made warfare impractical, increasing civilian trauma without effectively solving the problem. A US Ranger friend of mine with Central Asian tours under his belt once said to me, "The Army breaks things. That's what it's good at, and what it's designed to do." Sending the military into Central Asia to break things, without committing to rebuilding that region–something I'm not sure we could do, given the complexity of the societies–seems likely to sow more, not less individual trauma, which leads to more, not fewer, broken institutions, and eventually more, not fewer, aggressor states.

      The whole point of WWI, Jac, is that none of the major powers were in any danger of being "enslaved" in 1914. The whole of Europe had enjoyed seventy years of peace, with concomitant increases in material wealth, health, education, and social mobility. Britain and France were liberal democracies; Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary were all autocracies progressing at various rates towards liberalization. And yet, at the beginning of the War, each government used exactly the terminology that you did–"defending oneself," "protecting one's people," keeping from "being enslaved." The rhetoric was so incessant that it speedily created a reality–one where all of Europe was indeed, under attack. But the death of the crown prince of Austria-Hungary (soon to assume the throne, and speed up the liberalizing of that empire) did not HAVE to cause a global conflagration. It was the romantic attachment to rhetoric, and the too-hasty use of military might, which created the crisis.

      To be sure, there are times when war is, perhaps, the lesser of two evils. But it is very, very difficult to predict when the reasons given for war are indeed a factual revelation of clear and present danger, and not propaganda, yellow journalism, or a convenience of power. Because technology continues to magnify the consequences of our actions in this area–as it does in so many areas–it's incumbent on us to be ever more cautious in our exercise of military force. You may find that idealistic; to me it seems utterly practical.

      Thanks for reading!

      • Ovid says:

        I have to disagree that Stalin's Russia was an aggressor state. It was a totalitarian state, and an undemocratic state, but it wasn't an aggressor state either before WWII or before the Cold War. The problem was that after WWII communism was a political threat almost everywhere. The United States precipitated the division of Germany and Europe for economic reasons–I don't think anyone is going to ever be able to rebut Caroline Eisenberg's Drawing the Line on that. And those who take the view that the United States wasn't a danger to Stalin or the USSR would have trouble explaining To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans by Kaku and Axlerod (1987). You can read in that book what the US military had planned for Stalin if they got in the position to pull it off without the Red Army being able to overrun Western Europe. They just never got to that position. Kaku's book is an important and inexpensive book, and people should read it.

    • Ovid says:

      A "complete detachment with reality" is pretty strong criticism. That reminds me of something Al Haig or Cheney might have said. And the general outlook seems to accept the necessity of force to the point of embracing it. Robert McNamara warned about the problems this gives rise to in his memoir, In Retrospect, and then also in Fog of War. We had a lot of very close nuclear calls because of this outlook, and a couple of nasty Asian wars with a few million deaths too, if we count the Koreans and Vietnamese. William Lind coined the term Fourth Generation Warfare and claims to view it as a big change in warfare for some reason, but he has also referred to multiculturalism as a "poisonous" ideology in our society and described Islam as "the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent," ading that "immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army." With that, he revealed how he views the world. Beneath the strategic veneer, Lind's is a very old-fashioned outlook.

  4. Ovid says:

    Lind's theory of Fourth Generation Warfare took off a few years after the Cold War ended, which was handy because there was no longer another superpower around as a threat to justify our military commitments and posture. An observant reader of James Mann's recent book, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, can witness the great sense of panic that permeated the National Security bureaucracy in the late 1980s as Gorbachev progressively took steps to end the Cold War and Reagan encouraged him. Reagon, a simple man, was eager to end the Cold War. Reagan's cabinet even called in Nixon and Kissinger to try to talk Reagan into mistrusting Gorbachev as merely the most clever communist leader ever. There was a pervasive fear in the military and intelligence community that all our commitments would be jeopardized by the Soviets abandoning communism and ceasing to be dangerous. But, of course, LInd and others found new dangers soon enough, with the help of idiots like Saddam Hussein who were stupid enough to believe that a wink and a nod meant we really didn't care who controlled all that oil in the Gulf. (Such a fool Saddam was!)

  5. Ovid says:

    The Machiavellian types always have claimed in all historical epochs that theirs is the realistic view, but typically they just don't admit the magnitude and consequences of their own mistakes putting this idea into practice. A fine recent book that provides another example of this is The Imperial Cruise, which describes Theodore Roosevelt covertly agreeing to let the Japanese have Korea, which exceeded his Constitutional authority and paved the way for future problems of real enormity with Japan within a few decades, though TR was never one to second-guess himself or be overly honest with himself or anyone else. TR had the same problem many militarists do–at bottom he thought war was the most noble of human activities. Woodrow Wilson didn't share that view at all, and that's a large part of TR's subsequent contempt for him. There's too much love of militarism in our military today too, as one can easily see by reading Andrew Bacevich's books.

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